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ABSTRACT 
Collective action can help individuals, groups, and communities achieve common 
goals, thus contributing to poverty reduction. Drawing on longitudinal household 
and qualitative community data, the authors examine the impact of shocks on 
household living standards, study the correlates of participation in groups and 
formal and informal networks, and discuss the relationship of networks with access 
to other forms of capital. In this context, they assess how one form of collective 
action, iddir, or burial societies, help households attenuate the impact of illness. 
They find that iddir effectively deal with problems of asymmetric information by 
restricting membership geographically, imposing a membership fee, and conducting 
checks on how the funds were spent. The study also finds that while iddir help poor 
households cope with individual health shocks, but shows that the better-off 
households belong to more groups and have larger networks. In addition, where 
households have limited ability to develop spatial networks, collective action has 
limited ability to respond to covariate shocks. Therefore, realism is needed in terms 
of the ability of collective action to respond to shocks, and direct public action is 
more appropriate to deal with common shocks.  
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COLLECTIVE ACTION AND VULNERABILITY 
Burial Societies in Rural Ethiopia  
Stefan Dercon, John Hoddinott,
1 Pramila Krishnan, and Tassew Woldehannna 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Collective action has both intrinsic and instrumental value. Being part of a group 
and participating towards meeting a common objective provides direct benefits to 
individuals. In the Ethiopian survey data used in this study, individuals who report 
having larger networks also report higher levels of happiness. Such correlations are 
not unique to Ethiopia. Using data from the World Values Survey (Helliwell and 
Putnam, 2004) found that individuals who report higher levels of individual and 
collective civic engagement also reported higher scores on measures of subjective 
well-being. Collective action is also a means to an end. For example, the joint 
management of irrigation canals, rangelands, and fisheries are actions by groups 
that allow individuals to generate higher and more sustainable incomes. The focus 
of this paper is a specific, instrumental dimension of collective action: the role of 
groups and networks in helping households in poor communities manage their 
exposure to risks and cope with shocks to their livelihoods.  
In doing so, the paper builds on research addressing how poor households 
respond to shocks.
2 These show that households can partially smooth consumption 
in the face of shocks, but not perfectly; as might be expected, idiosyncratic shocks 
(low or late rainfall on household plots) are more likely to be insured collectively 
than are generalized shocks (low rainfall on most plots in the village). In most 
empirical studies of risk-smoothing (Townsend, 1994), the insurance unit is often 
assumed to be the village. Studies using his approach often find that households 
are able to cope with idiosyncratic shocks, but not covariate shocks—implying that 
local insurance mechanisms are inadequate to cope with aggregate shocks. More 
recent studies (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005) have begun to question the 
assumption that the appropriate unit of risk-smoothing is the village. They suggest 
that consumption is smoothed within sub caste networks, which extend beyond the 
village. Indeed, the literature on migration and remittances suggests that networks 
can cross geographic boundaries, with the formation of migrant networks in the 
destination being affected by shocks in the origin locality (Munshi, 2003).  
There is also a subset of studies that attempts to isolate the role of gift-
giving and informal loans for households to cope with shocks; results indicate that 
households are not perfectly altruistic; the problems of asymmetric information and 
limited commitment mean that households are not likely to be fully insured (Ligon 
et al., 2000; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2000).
3 However, such analyses do not assess 
                                                      
 
1 Corresponding author: J.Hoddinott@cgiar.org 
2 See Morduch (2005) and references therein, the review paper by Skoufias and Quisumbing 
(2005), and the recent collection edited by Dercon (2005). 
3 However, Genicot and Ray (2003) show that with imperfect enforceability of contracts, stable 
insurance groups can exist above or below village-level.  
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whether responses differ depending on the nature of the shock, and indicators for 
collective action and participation in different types of networks are generally are 
either absent or rudimentary. There are some exceptions. Fafchamps and Lund 
(2003) differentiate among different types of risk and specifically address how 
different networks are used. They show that risk-sharing appears to occur mostly in 
very small networks of close friends and families—networks that may not have the 
heterogeneity required to efficiently share risk. In Ethiopia, Dercon and Krishnan 
(2000) specifically address potential gender differences in terms of risk-coping, and 
find that poor women, particularly in one region, are less able to smooth 
consumption in the face of risks. 
The collective action literature shows that the density of networks in general, 
and participation in more formal groups in particular, can lead to either more 
effective participation in community-based activities (White and Runge, 1994; 
Isham and Kahkonen, 2002) or higher household incomes (Pender and Scherr, 
2002; Haddad and Maluccio, 2003; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). However, there is 
a lack of consensus on the impact of heterogeneity on collective action. In most 
empirical studies where researchers use various measures of heterogeneity to 
examine the impact on collective action or on household incomes directly, the 
impact of any type of heterogeneity tends to be negative, or not significant (Ahuja, 
1998; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Bardhan, 2000; McCarthy and Vanderlinden, 
2004; Place et al., 2004), with the interesting exception of results reported by 
Grootaert (2001). It is often hypothesized that heterogeneity of any sort makes 
finding agreements mutually beneficial and acceptable to all more costly, and that 
sociocultural heterogeneity in particular is likely to reduce trust among group 
members and also reduce the efficacy of social sanctioning (Easterly and Levine, 
1997). On the other hand, much of the literature on group formation and networks 
highlights the added benefits to diversity (or heterogeneity) among members along 
any number of dimensions. Risk-pooling will certainly be more efficient when one’s 
income is less correlated with other members in the groups, which implies that 
having members with different agricultural activities and occupational structure is 
better for the insurance mechanism. Many networks exist to share information; 
clearly, if everyone has the same background and the same current sociocultural 
and economic profile, there is little need to rely on networks to share information. 
Finally, there may be economies of scope in terms of information gathering—or 
accumulation of other assets, for that matter. In this case, economic heterogeneity 
also favors pooling of resources to the benefit of all. Because there may be 
competing impacts of different types of heterogeneity on the functioning of groups, 
it becomes critical to examine which groups are able to harness the positive, and 
mitigate the negative effects, of heterogeneity. 
Finally, if groups differ in terms of degree of heterogeneity and geographic 
dispersion, what kinds of enforcement mechanisms are used to ensure compliance 
to network objectives and norms of behavior? Members of local networks are easier 
to monitor, but local networks are less able to insure against covariate shocks. 
Spatially diversified networks offer some protection against covariate shocks, but 
network members will be more difficult to monitor. If information and 
communications technologies are poor, more distant network members may not 
even be aware of a shock that occurred in their origin communities.  
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Interest in these issues is more than just academic curiosity. Understanding 
these networks is as crucial to understanding the determinants of poverty and the 
policies to move people out of poverty as understanding land tenure or access to 
financial capital. A misunderstanding of the roles of these networks can lead to 
policy changes that have unintended consequences on the functioning of these 
networks, with potentially damaging effects on the capacity of the poor to mitigate, 
and cope with, the effects of shocks. At the same time, a better understanding of 
such networks can lead to the identification of policies that complement existing 
networks that already serve the poor well, and to policies that can substitute for 
networks that simply are not reaching the poor. 
In the material that follows, we address these issues by drawing on rich 
longitudinal household and qualitative community data from Ethiopia. After 
describing these data in some detail, we examine the shocks these households face 
and their impact on living standards. We then look at the correlates of participation 
in groups and networks—both formal and informal—and the relationship of 
networks with access to other forms of capital. In the final substantive section, we 
pull these together to assess how one form of collective action, iddir (burial 
societies or funeral associations), allow households to attenuate the impact of 
illness. 
2. DATA AND CONTEXT 
Ethiopia is a federal country divided into 11 regions. Each region is sub-divided into 
zones and the zones into woredas, which are roughly equivalent to a county in the 
US or UK. Woredas, in turn, are divided into Peasant Associations (PA), or kebeles, 
an administrative unit consisting of a number of villages. Peasant Associations were 
set up in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution. Our data are taken from the 
Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS), a unique longitudinal household data set 
covering households in 15 areas of rural Ethiopia. Data collection started in 1989, 
when a survey team visited six Peasant Associations in Central and Southern 
Ethiopia. The survey was expanded in 1994 to encompass 15 Peasant Associations 
across the country, yielding a sample of 1477 households. As part of the survey re-
design and extension that took place in 1994, the sample was re-randomized by 
including an exact proportion of newly formed or arrived households in the sample, 
as well as by replacing households lost to follow-up by others considered broadly 
similar to them in demographic and wealth terms by village elders and officials. The 
nine additional PAs were selected to better account for the diversity in the farming 
systems found in Ethiopia. The sampling in the PAs newly included in 1994 was 
based on a list of all households that was constructed with the help of the local 
Peasant Association officials.
4 The sample was stratified within each village to 
ensure that a representative number of landless households were also included. 
Similarly, an exact proportion of female headed households were included via 
                                                      
 
4 The PA was responsible for the implementation of land reform following 1974 and held wide 
ranging powers as a local authority. All land is owned by the government. To obtain land, households 
have to register with the PA and, thus, lists are maintained of the households who have been allocated 




stratification. Consequently, as Dercon (Dercon et al., 2005) shows, population 
shares within the sample are broadly consistent with the population shares in the 
three main sedentary farming systems—the plough-based cereals farming systems 
of the Northern and Central Highlands, mixed plough/hoe cereals farming systems, 
and farming systems based around enset (a root crop also called “false banana”), 
which is grown in southern parts of the country. Note too that in 1994, the Central 
Statistical Office collected a data set as part of the Welfare Monitoring System. 
Many of the average outcome variables, in terms of health and nutrition, were very 
similar to the results in the ERHS, suggesting that living conditions in our sample 
did not differ greatly from those found more generally throughout rural Ethiopia 
(Collier et al., 1997). For these reasons, the sampling frame to select the villages 
can be seen as one that was stratified by agro-ecological zones and subzones, with 
one to three villages selected per strata. Further, sample sizes in each village were 
chosen so as to approximate a self-weighting sample, when considered in terms of 
farming system: each person (approximately) represents the same number of 
persons found in the main farming systems as of 1994. However, we use this 
feature of the sample cautiously. It does not include pastoral households or urban 
areas. Also, the practical aspects associated with running a longitudinal household 
survey, when the sampled localities are as much as 1,000 kilometers apart in a 
country where top speeds on the best roads rarely exceed 50 kilometers per hour, 
constrained sampling to only 15 communities in a country of thousands of villages. 
So while these data can be considered broadly representative of households in 
nonpastoralist farming systems as of 1994, extrapolation from these results should 
be done with care. 
Additional survey rounds were subsequently in late 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 
and 2004. These surveys were conducted, either individually or collectively, by the 
Economics Department at Addis Ababa University, the Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, the University of Oxford, and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute. Sample attrition between 1994 and 2004 is low, with a loss of 
only 12.4 percent (or 1.3 percent per year) of the sample over this 10-year period, 
in part because of this institutional continuity. This continuity also helped ensure 
that questions asked in each round were identical, or very similar, to those asked in 
previous rounds and that the data were processed in comparable ways.
5 In 
addition, detailed qualitative studies were undertaken in the mid-1990s, the results 
of which are reported in Bevan and Pankhurst (1996).
6 Smaller scale qualitative 
studies have been carried out in selected survey sites on specific topics, including 
some on collective action (see Section 5). 
                                                      
 
5 We examined whether this sample attrition is nonrandom. Over the period 1994-2004, there are 
no significant differences between attriters and non-attriters in terms of initial levels of characteristics 
of the head (age, sex), assets (fertile land, all landholdings, cattle), or consumption. However, 
attriting households were, at baseline, smaller than non-attriting households. Between 1999 and 
2004, there are some significant differences by village with one village, Shumsha, having a higher 
attrition rate than others in the sample. Our survey supervisors recorded the reason why a household 
could not be traced. Using these data, we examined attrition in Shumsha on a case-by-case basis, but 
could not find any dominant reason why households attrited. 
6 These are in the process of being updated, based on new fieldwork carried out in 2004 and 2005.  
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics based on the 2004 survey round. Two 
features are immediately apparent. First, these households are very poor. Mean 
monthly consumption per capita was 106 birr or about US$13 per person and about 
36 percent are below the poverty line. Second, agriculture is the dominant source 
of income for these households, accounting for two-thirds of household income. 
Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of the Ethiopian sample, 2004 
Characteristic   
Demographic   
 Mean household size  5.7 people 
 Percent households that are female-headed  30.3% 
 Percent of household heads with any 
education  23.1% 
Living standards   
 Monthly consumption per capita, Mean  106.2 birr 
 Monthly consumption per capita, Median  75.1 birr 
 Percent households below poverty line  36% 
Income sources, percentages   
 Crop income  67% 
 Wage income  5% 
 Self-employment  19% 
 Transfers  8% 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, 2004.
7 
3. SHOCKS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA  
We define shocks as adverse events that lead to a loss of household income, a 
reduction in consumption, a loss of productive assets, and/or serious 
concern/anxiety about household welfare. Data used in this section are based on a 
household-level shocks module (Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003). The module 
asks households to consider a list of adverse events and indicate whether the 
household was adversely affected by them. Ethiopian respondents were asked, “Has 
this household been affected by a serious shock—an event that led to a serious 
reduction in your asset holdings, caused your household income to fall 
substantially, or resulted in a significant reduction in consumption?”  
Shocks are divided into a number of broad categories: climatic; economic; 
political/social/legal; crime; and health. Climatic shocks include obvious examples 
such as drought and flooding, but also erosion, frosts, and pestilence affecting 
                                                      
 
7 For details on construction of consumption and income aggregates and poverty line, see Dercon 
(Dercon et al., 2007). Monetary figures as in 2004 birr. At the time of the survey, the birr-US dollar 
exchange rate was approximately 8 birr to the dollar. Self-employment includes incomes from 
processing agricultural products (livestock, beer) and nonagricultural activities such as trading or 




crops or livestock. Economic shocks include problems in terms of access to inputs 
(both physical access and large increases in price), decreases in output prices, and 
difficulties in selling agricultural and nonagricultural products. Political/social/legal 
shocks include the confiscation of assets or arbitrary taxation by government 
authorities, social or political discrimination, or exclusion and contract disputes. 
Crime shocks include the theft and/or destruction of crops, livestock, housing, tools 
or household durables as well as crimes against persons. Health shocks include 
both death and illness. We also consider miscellaneous shocks such as conflicts and 
disputes with other family members, neighbors, or other village residents regarding 
access to land or other assets. Finally, in addition to these questions about specific 
shocks, households were also asked to enumerate the three most important 
adverse shocks that they had experienced over the previous five years. 
As Table 2 shows, virtually all households in the Ethiopian sample (95 
percent) reported a most important shock, 85 percent reported a second most 
important shock, and 62 percent reported a third most important shock. The most 
commonly reported worst shocks are drought (47 percent), death (43 percent), and 
illness (28 percent). When we disaggregate by degree of importance of these worst 
shocks (not reported here), we see that these same three shocks were always 
listed as being the most important adverse shocks experienced by these 
households. Input and output shocks, pests affecting crops, and crime are all 
reported by between 11 and 14 percent of households. Other shocks are less 
frequently reported. Strikingly, policy shocks (land redistribution, state confiscation 
of assets, resettlement, villagization or forced migration, bans on migration, forced 
contributions, or arbitrary taxation), which featured so prominently in earlier rounds 
of the ERHS, have substantially diminished in importance. Only seven percent of 
households reported being adversely affected by such policy shocks compared to 42 
percent who reported being affected by these prior to 1994 (Dercon and Krishnan, 
2002; Table 1). 
While these data provide a detailed overview of the types of shocks 
experienced by households, it does not give us a quantitative sense of their 
consequences. Also, there are limits to cross-sectional analysis—it is difficult to tell, 
for example, if, conditional on location, wealth, and other observable 
characteristics, female-headed households in Ethiopia are more adversely affected 
by droughts than male-headed households. For these reasons, we summarize the 
results of Dercon (Dercon et al., 2005), who reported an econometric assessment 
of the impact of these shocks on one measure of welfare, log per capita 
consumption.
8  
                                                      
 
8 Consumption is the sum of food and nonfood consumption. For each food item, households were 
asked about the amounts they had consumed out of purchases, consumption out of own stock, and 
consumption from gifts and wages in-kind in the last week. In general, these consumption levels are 
valued using prices obtained from local market surveys fielded at the same time as the household 
survey. Nonfood items are limited to non-investment goods so that we include consumables such as 
matches, batteries, soap, kerosene and the like, clothing, and transport, but exclude investments in 
durable goods such as housing. Different recall periods were used for different items; for comparability 
all are changed into monthly (30-day) consumption and expressed in per capita terms. Dercon and 
Krishnan (2003) show that earlier survey rounds, using various permutations of adult equivalency, 
does not fundamentally affect the analysis of the determinants of living standards.  
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Table 2. Household self-reports of the worst shocks experienced between 
1999 and 2004, Ethiopia 
Worst shocks  Percent 
Most commonly reported   
Drought  46.8 
Death of head, spouse or another person  42.7 
Illness of head, spouse or another person   28.1 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices  14.5 
Pests or diseases that affected crops  13.8 
Crime  12.7 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices  11.3 
Policy/political shocks (land redistribution, state confiscation of assets, 
resettlement, villagization, or forced migration, bans on migration, forced 
contributions, or arbitrary taxation)  7.4 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock  7.0 
Most commonly reported, by degree of importance   
Most important shock   
Drought  32.6 
Death of head, spouse, or another person  26.1 
Illness of head, spouse, or another person   8.0 
Second most important shock   
Death of head, spouse, or another person  14.8 
Drought  13.6 
Illness of head, spouse, or another person   12.3 
Third most important shock   
Illness of head, spouse, or another person  12.2 
Death of head, spouse, or another person  8.1 
Drought  8.0 
Source: the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, Round 6.
9 
 
Log per capita consumption (lnpcexp) of household i in village v in time t is a 
function of two broad sets of household characteristics: household characteristics 
observed in the past (time t-1) (Hiv, t-1) and shocks to households experienced 
between time t-1 and time t(Siv, t).
10 Vectors of parameters to be estimated are γ, β, 
                                                      
 
9 1,371 households provided reported information; in response to the question, “what were the 
three most important shocks to affect this household,” 95 percent of households reported a most 
important shock, 85 percent reported a second most important shock, and 62 percent reported a third 
most important shock. 
10 In very loose terms, the specification of equation (1) can be thought of as one where, á la 
Friedman, consumption reflects the underlying asset base (which generates “permanent income”) as 
well as transitory events that cause consumption to deviate from this level.  
We also include a vector that captures such potentially confounding factors such as the month in 
which the interview took place to capture seasonality.  
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and κ. In Ethiopia, log per capita consumption is measured in 2004, while past 
household characteristics from 1999 are used as regressors. Denoting εiv, t as the 
white noise disturbance term, we write this relationship as 
 
 lnpcexpiv, t = γ · Hiv, t-1 + β · Siv, t + κ · Xiv, t + εiv, t .  (1) 
 
Observable household characteristics are characteristics of the head (age, 
sex, and schooling), demographic household characteristics (log size and 
dependency ratio), and household wealth: landholdings and livestock ownership, 
the latter expressed in livestock units. Also included are measures of households’ 
networks and connections within the village that may also affect consumption 
levels: whether the household belongs to an ethnic or religious minority; whether it 
is related to anyone holding an official position in the locality; and whether a parent 
of the household head was an important person in the social life of the village. As 
some shocks are relatively more common than others, we aggregate the data we 
have on shocks into several categories, whether the household had experienced the 
following events that had led to a loss of household income, a reduction in 
consumption, and/or a loss of productive assets; a drought; too much rain, pests or 
diseases that affected field crops or crops in storage; pests or diseases that 
affected livestock; difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices; inability 
to sell or decreases in output prices; lack of demand for nonagricultural products; 
theft or destruction of tools, inputs, cash, crops, livestock, housing or consumer 
goods, death of head, spouse or another person; and illness of head, spouse, or 
another person. Finally, dummy variables are included for each village in Ethiopia. 
The implication is that shocks are identified by within-village (municipality) 
variation, which may make identification of covariate shocks difficult. However, 
even though covariate shocks are found in virtually all villages, even in the case of 
drought, there is no village where all households indicate having been affected in 
the last five years in Ethiopia. This allows us to identify of the impact of these 
relatively covariate events in our data. 
Basic results (Dercon et al., 2005) are reported in Table 3. The striking 
feature of the results of the shocks variables is how unimportant many of them 
seem to be. Experiencing a drought at least once in the previous five years lowers 
per capita consumption by approximately 20 percent and experiencing an illness 
that reduces per capita consumption by approximately 9 percent are the only shock 
variables that have a statistically significant effect on consumption. Other past 
shocks, controlling for a wide range of household characteristics, have no 
statistically significant impact on current (2004) levels of consumption. Table 3, 
however, examines only the average effects of these shocks across all households 
in the sample. In Table 4 we extend this earlier work by disaggregating along three 
dimensions of pre-shock (1999) household characteristics—sex of head, 
landholdings, and location—and explore the extent to which the impact of shocks 
differs across different household types. When we do so, some interesting 
differences do emerge: drought shocks have a more severe effect on female-
headed households and on poorer households as measured by landholdings; and 
illness shocks matter much more in survey areas south of Addis Ababa, where 
malaria is much more common. We return to this latter below.  
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Shocks in prior five years       
Drought -0.182  3.03*  2.49 
Floods 0.025  0.59  0.28 
Pests or diseases that affected field crops or 
crops in storage   -0.001  0.05 
0.01 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock   0.003  0.05  0.05 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in 
input prices  0.058  1.00 
1.11 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output 
prices   -0.076 1.16 
1.06 
Lack of demand for nonagricultural products   -0.108  0.93  0.83 
Theft or destruction of tools, inputs, cash, 
crops, livestock, housing, or consumer goods 
(crime) 0.051  0.96 
0.71 
Death of head, spouse, or another person  0.025  0.59  0.63 
Illness of head, spouse, or another person   -0.096  1.91*  1.68 
Other controls       
Female-headed, 1999  -0.024  0.45  0.39 
Log age head, 1999  0.092  1.25  1.30 
Head has schooling, 1999  0.082  1.39  2.19** 
Log household size, 1999  -0.284  6.36**  8.43** 
Dependency ratio, 1999  -0.033  1.92*  2.39** 
Household in second land quintile, 1999  0.062  0.98  1.10 
Household in third land quintile, 1999  0.140  2.29**  1.63 
Household in fourth land quintile, 1999  0.143  2.27**  2.21** 
Household in top land quintile, 1999  -0.036  0.49  0.42 
Livestock units, 1999  0.035  4.05**  3.64** 
Member, ethnic minority  0.192  2.89**  2.94** 
Member, religious minority  0.064  1.11  0.79 
Relative holds official position in PA  0.124  2.99**  3.39** 
Mother or father was important in social life of 
village  0.170 3.93** 
3.18** 
R
2 0.31    
Sample size  1,281    
                                                      
 
11 Notes: Standard errors are calculated using Huber-White method; *Significant at the 10 percent 
level; **significant at the 5 percent level; PA dummies are also included but not reported.  
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Table 4. Impact of shocks, by household characteristic on (log) 
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4. NETWORKS, GROUPS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Having described the broader environments that our respondents live in and the 
effects of shocks on them, our next step is to consider the role of collective action 
in mitigating these.  
In the 2004 survey round, households were asked to provide details “about 
the five most important people you can rely on in time of need for support, both 
within the village and elsewhere.” In addition, they were asked whether there were 
other people, beyond these five, who could be relied on for help in time of need. We 
call such individuals a “network,” and in this section we provide descriptive 
statistics on three dimensions of these networks: correlations between network size 
and observable household characteristics; characteristics of individuals within a 
household’s network; and the degree of network heterogeneity.  
                                                      
 
12 Notes: Specification as per Table 3; standard errors are calculated using Huber-White method; 




Virtually all households—91 percent—report that there is at least one person 
they can rely on for assistance. Figure 1 plots a density function for the size of 
networks reported by these households. The median number of people in a 
households’ network is five with about a quarter of households reporting that they 
have two or fewer people in their network and a smaller percentage (16 percent) 
reporting 10 or more people in their network. Further, there is some evidence that 
households do indeed call on these networks. Respondents indicate that they 
received help from 86 percent of the individuals they list as part of their network. 
There is also some evidence of reciprocity in these relationships: in 75 percent of 
the individuals listed as being in a household’s network, households had both 
received and provided assistance in the past. In fewer than 10 percent of 
individuals listed as part of a network had assistance neither been given nor 
received. 
Figure 1. Network size, Ethiopia 
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on some of the characteristics of 
individuals found in these networks. Most individuals in these networks are 
neighbors (60 percent) or, while not neighbors, live in the same village (27 
percent). However, just over a quarter have at least one plot of land adjacent to a 
plot held by the household. Only 13 percent of individuals in households’ network 
reside outside the village. The most common relationship is either being a relative 
or being a member of the same iddir; indeed, only 12 percent of network members 
are neither relatives nor members of the same iddir. Network members are often 



























to. They are unlikely to be individuals with whom the household sharecrops, hires 
in, or hires out labor or buys or sells crops. 
Table 5. Characteristics of individuals in a household’s network, Ethiopia 
Percentage of individuals who are  Percent 
Neighbors  60 
Not neighbors, but in same village  27 
Not neighbors, live outside village  13 
Have plot(s) of land next to plots belonging to this 
household  
28 
Members of the same mehabir (social group)  21 
Relative  66 
Belong to same iddir (burial society)  57 
Neither relative nor member of same iddir 12 
Members of the same labor-sharing group  43 
Partners in sharecropping or land renting arrangement  6 
Partners in oxen sharing arrangement  23 
Members of the same iqqub 7 
Borrow or lend money  49 
Do wage work  7 
Buy or sell crops  4 
Are other network members similar or dissimilar to our respondents? We 
consider two dimensions: comparative measures of wealth and age. If we stratify 
the sample by landownership, we find that poorer households have relatively 
better-off households in their network while richer households tend to have 
relatively poorer households in their network. However, when we compare oxen 
ownership, a different pattern emerges. Households with no oxen or only one 
animal tend to have as network partners similar households. Households with two 
or more oxen typically have as network partners other households with two or more 
oxen. Figure 2 graphs the distribution of the difference in age between the 
household head and other individuals in the network who are either relatives or 
members of the same iddir. The modal age difference for both is close to zero. 
However, while the distribution for age differences among iddir members is more 
peaked than for relatives, both are characterized by a considerable spread around 
this mode. 
Table 6 examines the associations between household characteristics and the 
likelihood that a household has a network as well as the size of that network. The 
first column reports the results of estimating a probit where the dependent variable 
equals one if the household has at least one person in its network, and zero 
otherwise. To make the coefficients readily interpretable, we report the marginal 
effects of the regressors in column 1. In columns 2 and 3, we report the 
determinants of the size of the household’s network. Because our estimates need to  
 
13 
take account of the fact that the dependent variable is censored at zero, we use a 
tobit estimator and this is reported in column 2.
13  
Figure 2. Age differences with networks, Ethiopia 
 
There are few household characteristics that are associated with an increased 
or decreased likelihood that a household has at least one person in its network. The 
only statistically significant characteristics are whether the household’s landholdings 
lie within the second to fifth quintiles within the village and whether the father of 
the household head belonged to an iddir that marginally increases (by 4.8 percent) 
the likelihood that the household has at least one person in its network. However, 
being wealthier, as defined in terms of landholdings, is associated with having a 
larger network. Households in the fourth and top land quintiles have one to two 
more people in their network compared to the households in the bottom quintile of 
landholdings. Larger households and households where the head has any formal 
schooling have larger networks. Family background also plays some role in 
influencing network size. Having a parent who was an important person in social life 
of the village, having a relative who holds an official position within the village, and 
                                                      
 
13 Because estimates derived from a tobit are suspect if the underlying disturbance terms are non-
normally distributed, we also report the results of estimating Powell’s (1984) censored least absolute 
deviations model. We report t-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors; following Davidson 
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having a father who belonged to an iddir all increase the mean number of persons 
in a household’s network. Lastly, households belonging to ethnic or religious 
minorities are not disadvantaged when it comes to network size.
14 
Table 6. Correlates of the presence of networks and their size, Ethiopia
15 























































































Mother or father was important 







                                                      
 
14 We note that De Weerdt (2005) obtains similar results in Tanzania, finding that kinship and 
wealth are also strong determinants of network formation. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) also find that 
in the Philippines, pre-existing personal relationships, rather than risk-pooling, dominate reasons for 
network formation. 
15 Notes: 1) Results of probit are presented in terms of the marginal effects of the regressors; 
dummy variables measure marginal impact of switching from zero to one; 2) Covariates marked with 
a † are dummy variables; 3) In column 1, absolute value of Z statistics are in parentheses; in columns 
2 and 3, absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors in column 1 are 
heteroscedastic-robust. Standard errors calculated in column 3 use a bootstrap with 1,000 
replications; 4) *Significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; and 5) PA 
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5. IDDIR AND THEIR ROLE IN MITIGATING SHOCKS 
In this section, we consider the role of one form of collective action—iddir, burial 
societies or funeral associations, and their role in mitigating shocks in Ethiopia. 
Members of iddir typically meet once or twice a month, making a small payment 
into a group fund (1-2 birr per month). A striking feature of these organizations is 
their degree of formality; often there are written rules and records of contributions 
and payouts (Dercon et al. 2006).
16 When a member dies, the iddir makes a 
payment to surviving family members in cash or in kind—the median amount paid 
out by the iddir that our households belong to is 100 birr, although there is some 
heterogeneity in these payments.
17  
Outside of Tigray, iddir membership is widespread, with nearly 90 percent of 
households reporting that they belong to at least one iddir. Among households who 
report belonging to iddir (and again excluding Tigray, where iddir do not exist), just 
under 60 percent report belonging to one iddir, 21 percent belong to two, and 
another 20 percent belong to three or more. Very few households, around 4 percent 
of the sample, claim that they do not belong to an iddir because they cannot afford 
the monthly dues. Virtually all iddir (93 percent) are situated within the PA. Two-
thirds of iddir appear to have no restrictions on membership beyond paying the 
necessary dues and fees, 14 percent were restricted to members of the same 
church or mosque, 6 percent were restricted to women, and 14 percent had some 
other restriction. All villages had at least one iddir that was open to anyone.
18 
Why are iddir of interest? In addition providing what is in effect a form of life 
insurance, a third of the iddir these households belong to provide cash payouts to 
their members when they have experienced other types of adverse shocks and a 
quarter offer loans. As Table 7 shows, the most common form of assistance apart 
                                                      
 
16 Also see the descriptions found in Dejene (1993, 1998) and Pankhurst (2003). Note that these 
characteristics are consistent with a number of the factors identified by Ostrom (Ostrom et al.,1994) 
as necessary for successful collective action, including the ability to collectively modify rules, the 
existence of sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms and a functioning management system. 
17 One birr is equal to approximately US$0.12 so that 100 birr is about US$13.  
18 In preliminary work, we examined the correlates of iddir membership. Wealthier households are 
more likely to join iddir, and to join more than one iddir, but the magnitude of these effects is not 
large. Larger households and households where the father of the head had been an iddir member are 
more likely to join iddir. However, being a female-headed household or belonging to an ethnic or 
religious minority had no statistically significant impact on the likelihood or extent of iddir 
membership. Full results are available on request.  
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from funerals is cash payouts in cases of fires. In addition, 10 percent of iddir 
provide cash in case of illness and 15 percent provide loans. However, the provision 
of some types of assistance is not found everywhere—for example, assistance in 
the case of illness is concentrated in four survey sites, all south of Addis Ababa. 
Noting this, we juxtapose the following observations: 1) after drought, households 
report that the two next most important types of shocks are illness and death 
(Table 2); 2) illness shocks have an especially large effect on consumption in 
villages located south of Addis Ababa (Table 4); 3) membership in iddir is 
widespread, and other iddir members are seen as being individuals who can be 
called on in times of need (Table 5); and 4) in selected localities, some iddir provide 
assistance when illness shocks occur (Table 7).  
Table 7. Events for which iddir make payouts or offer loans 
Event  Iddir will give a cash 
transfer 
Iddir will give a loan 
 (percent)  (percent) 
Funeral 100  9 
Fire 20  9 
Loss of oxen or other 
livestock 
7 3 
Destruction of house  6  4 
Wedding 5  5 
Illness 10  15 
Harvest loss  3  2 
Other event  6  1 
    
Any event  34  25 
Two questions arise: 1) does this provision of assistance when illness shocks 
occur—in effect a form of health insurance—reduce their impact on consumption; 
and 2) if the answer to question one is affirmative, how do these iddir overcome 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that typically bedevil insurance 
schemes.  
Answering question one is tricky because households can choose which iddir 
they wish to belong to. Because membership in iddir is endogenous, we cannot, for 
example, insert membership in iddir providing health insurance into one to see how 
it modifies the impact of self-reported illness shocks—coefficients from such a 
regression will be biased and inconsistent. Instead, we take a different approach. 
We start by restricting the sample to villages south of Addis Ababa, where, in 
general, illness shocks have the largest effect on consumption. We separate these 
southern villages into two groups: those where iddir that provide health insurance 
are present, and those where they are not present. Within these groups of villages, 
we estimate equation one using a modification of the specification reported in Table 
3.
19 Finally, we restrict the sample to households in the lowest three landholding 
                                                      
 
19 Specifically, in order to conserve degrees of freedom, we drop a number of variables that do not 
have explanatory power: age and sex of household head and four shocks: input prices, output prices,  
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quintiles to see if the availability of such insurance is particularly important for 
poorer households. 
Results are reported in Table 8. These show that illness shocks reported by 
poor households residing in villages where no iddir provide health insurance are 
associated with a large—20 percent—reduction in per capita consumption. By 
contrast, the impact of illness shocks on poor households in villages where iddir do 
provide health insurance is smaller and not statistically significant.
20 These results 
are suggestive that the availability of this health insurance attenuates illness 
shocks. 









Impact of illness of head, spouse or another person on 
households in bottom three land quintiles 
  
Households residing in villages where iddir provide health 
insurance 
-0.144 1.03 
Households residing in villages where iddir do not provide 
health insurance 
-0.205 2.08** 
However, our household data have only limited information on how iddir 
manage the provision of health insurance. For this reason, we organized a small 
survey of iddir in four villages where the ERHS data indicated that iddir provided 
this form of assistance.
22 The challenge in doing so was finding these iddir. There is 
no official list of iddir, let alone lists that describe which iddir provide which type of 
assistance. Iddir do not exist in a physical sense—for example, there is no iddir 
office. The names of iddir can be lengthy and are often shortened in different ways 
by different people. Leadership of iddir is, in many cases, on an elected basis, and 
so the names of iddir leaders change over time. Given all this, we organized the 
survey in the following fashion. Using the ERHS data, we generated a list of iddir in 
the four villages where iddir were known to provide health insurance. Enumerators 
were given a list of the names of 12 iddir that provided either cash grants or loans 
in the case of illness, along with identifying information such as alternate names, 
dates these iddir were formed, approximate number of members, and names of 
leaders such as the iddir chair. Enumerators were instructed to find at least eight of 
these. Once found, they asked if a small number of members would be willing to 
participate in a discussion about how this form of health insurance worked. The 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
floods, and crime. If these are included, the coefficients reported in Table 8 do not change but the 
standard errors increase.  
20 This result also holds true if the standard errors are constructed so as to account for clustering 
at the village level.  
21 Notes: Specification is a modified version of that reported in Table 3; standard errors are 
calculated using Huber-White method; *significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 
percent level. 
22 The villages were Sirbana Godeti, Korodegaga, Tirufe Ketchma, and Garagodo.  
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meetings included the iddir chair and, in nearly all cases, at least two other 
individuals knowledgeable about the functioning of the iddir, including the 
treasurer. Across all four villages, a semi-structured questionnaire was 
administered to 33 iddir. Some questions were pre-coded (for example, “Are 
members charged interest if they take a loan to cover health expenses?”) while 
others were designed to encourage iddir members to explain how they functioned 
(for example, “How do members go about requesting assistance?”).  
The successful provision of insurance revolves around the resolution of two 
forms of asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. In the 
context of health insurance, adverse selection arises because individuals who are 
less healthy than others have a greater incentive to seek insurance but the 
healthiness of such individuals is difficult to observe by the insurer. Moral hazard 
occurs where, once insured, an individual does not bear the full consequences of 
actions which are (at least partially) unobserved by the insurer. 
How do iddir deal with these problems of asymmetric information? One 
obvious way would be to impose restrictions on who can join and when they join. 
The household survey asked iddir participants if their iddir restricted membership in 
any way. In the four villages where health insurance is offered, most (81 percent) 
iddir described by respondents imposed some sort of membership restriction. As 
Table 9 shows, the most common restriction was geographic—all members had to 
live in the same Peasant Association (PA). Other common restrictions include 
belonging to the same church or mosque or being women-only. Membership 
restrictions based on clan, ethnicity, or youth were not common and beyond these 
broad categories, no other restrictions were mentioned. Iddir that imposed certain 
types of membership restrictions—based on residing in the same PA or 
church/mosque—were more likely to provide health insurance than those that did 
not (see Table 9), even after taking into account other iddir characteristics, such as 
age, number of members, and location (see Table 10). In the iddir survey, a 
number of respondents commented that this restriction exists largely because it 
was impractical for members to attend monthly meetings if they live too far away, a 
point we return to below. By contrast, there does not appear to be restrictions on 
when individuals can join these iddir. In almost all cases, new members could join 
at any time and only two required that new members belonged for a minimum 
length of time before they are eligible for assistance with health shocks. However, 
individuals who join after the iddir is formed must pay a membership fee (Dercon et 
al., 2006).   
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Table 9. Characteristics of iddir, by provision of health insurance
23 
   Percentage  of  iddir that   
Membership restriction 
Percentage 













Must reside in PA  41.0%  23.5%  38.1%  0.04** 
Must belong to the same clan  4.0  28.3  57.1  0.10* 
Must belong to the same church or 
mosque 24.9  26.2  39.5  0.10* 
Must belong to the same ethnic 
group 4.0  28.5  50.0  0.19 
Youth only  4.0  30.0  14.3  0.37 
Women only  23.7  30.3  26.8  0.67 
All 33 surveyed iddir stated that members who wanted to request assistance 
should do so before they incurred any expenditures; only two would consider 
requests from members after expenditures are incurred. Further, assistance is 
almost always limited to direct medical expenses: only one iddir would provide 
funds to pay for hiring workers to assist with agricultural tasks; only one iddir 
would pay for hiring someone to assist with domestic tasks; and none would 
compensate for loss of income as a result of illness. 
Table 10. Correlates of the provision of health insurance in selected survey 
areas
24 
Covariate Marginal  effect 
z statistic 
(absolute value) 
Membership restriction     
Must reside in PA†  0.197  2.15** 
Must belong to the same clan†  0.174  0.81 
Must belong to the same church or mosque†   0.210  2.12** 
Women only†  0.060  0.62 
    




th quartile for size†  0.139  1.79* 
The feature uniting these shared characteristics is the way in which they 
address the problem of asymmetric information. Restricting membership 
geographically makes it easier to learn about members and to monitor their 
                                                      
 
23 Notes: *significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level. 
24 Notes: Results of probit are presented in terms of the marginal effects of the regressors; 
dummy variables measure marginal impact of switching from zero to one. Covariates marked with a † 
are dummy variables. Standard errors are calculated using Huber-White method; *significant at the 
10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; PA dummies are included but not reported. 
Sample size is 169.  
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behavior. The same is true about the requirement for common church or mosque 
membership.
25 Direct medical costs are observable. For example, one iddir reported 
that his neighbors serve as an informant. For example, if the member takes the 
money for medication and if he does not go to clinic/hospital, he will be asked to 
return the money. Other means of checking include going to the home of the 
member and asking to see receipts. In fact, about a third of the iddir surveyed 
stated that they had formal checks in place to make sure these funds were spent on 
medical related costs. Second, a considerable number of iddir conducted 
background checks prior to approving a grant or loan—visiting the member at home 
or asking neighbors to confirm that assistance was needed. By contrast, 
compensation for income loss is much more problematic because it is difficult to 
determine how much of the income loss was directly ascribable to illness. The one 
component that these mechanisms do not address is that of adverse selection; here 
in the guise that individuals who might anticipate having to incur medical expenses 
in the future would join with the express purpose of accessing funds held by the 
iddir. While iddir do not prevent this directly—recall that new members can join at 
any time and very few restrict new members’ access to health insurance—the 
imposition of a membership fee for new members discourages such behavior. 
In addition to these mechanisms for dealing with informational asymmetries, 
these iddir take a number of steps to reduce the likelihood that the provision of 
health insurance will lead to financial difficulties for the iddir. One is their age 
structure. As Figure 2 shows, there is considerable dispersion in the distribution of 
ages of iddir members. As a result, there is—in effect—health insurance across 
generations as young members contribute to the iddir while older members are 
more likely to have age-related illnesses. Another observation consistent with this 
argument is that youth-only iddir are less likely, related to other iddir, to provide 
health insurance.  
A second mechanism is size. Preliminary work with the ERHS data suggested 
a non-linear relationship between the likelihood of providing assistance with iddir in 
the second, third or fourth quartiles, as ranked by size, being slightly less likely to 
provide health insurance (see Table 10). Third, what is especially interesting is that 
the amount of money provided to members, either in the form of cash or loans, is 
tied fairly tightly to the amount of money iddir collect each month. Figure 3 shows 
that the 33 surveyed iddir are fairly conservative in this regard. The median iddir 
providing cash grants provides an amount equal to one month’s income, and the 
maximum cash grant of the iddir at the 75
th percentile is slightly more than two 
month’s income. Loans as a ratio of monthly income tend to be higher than cash 
grants. However, while few (4/33) iddir charge interest on these loans, about 75 
percent require repayment within three months. In addition, most (82 percent) 
impose sanctions if members do not repay: either taking the individuals to local 
court or prohibiting them from making monthly contributions. The latter is 
especially effective because members who fail to make monthly contributions risk 
forfeiting their claim to their past contributions. 
                                                      
 
25 Another advantage of church or mosque membership is that observance of certain religious 
principles—such as prohibitions on smoking and drinking; the encouragement of monogamous 
relationships—discourages adverse selection problems (sinners need not apply) while reducing moral 
hazard.   
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To summarize, health shocks have serious consequences for consumption 
levels of rural Ethiopian households. In some localities, where a form of collective 
action—iddir or burial societies—provide a form of health insurance and in these 
villages, illness shocks appear to have smaller effects on consumption. These iddir 
have managed to address problems of asymmetric information by imposing 
membership restrictions that reduce the cost of obtaining information; restricting 
assistance to an observable component of illness shocks; and by using membership 
fees to discourage adverse selection. Further, they use a number of mechanisms to 
ensure financial sustainability: age structure, grant and loan size relative to income, 
and a series of mechanisms to ensure timely repayment of loans. 
























25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Typical cash to income Max cash to income Typical loan to income Max loan to income
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Using longitudinal data and qualitative survey work, we have attempted to 
understand the role of groups and networks in determining how the poor manage 
their exposure to risks and cope with shocks to their livelihoods. In these Ethiopian 
villages, drought and illness have especially malign effects; for example, illness 
shocks reduce per capita consumption by 9 percent in regions where malaria is 
endemic. Nearly all households in the ERHS report that they have a network of 
individuals whom they can call on for help. These networks consist largely of other 
households in the same village. This suggests that the scope for addressing 
covariate risks is likely to be limited, a supposition borne out by the observation, 
made in Section 3, that drought shocks lead to reductions in household 
consumption levels. Individuals within these networks would appear to engage in  
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reciprocal assistance. Further, they typically have other ties; in particular, they are 
relatives, members of the same iddir, or members of the same labor-sharing group. 
Better-off households tend to have larger networks as do households whose 
relations (parents or other relatives) had either status or connections within the 
village. Network heterogeneity is mixed: network members tend to be varied when 
measured by age or landownership but not in terms of ownership of oxen. Iddir 
providing health insurance are homogeneous along some dimensions (geography, 
and to a certain extent, religion) but heterogeneous with respect to age. They 
impose membership restrictions that reduce the cost of obtaining information and 
restrict assistance to an observable component of illness shocks (medical 
expenditures) that can be verified; further, they limit the extent of their assistance 
so that the provision of assistance does not come at the cost of financial 
sustainability.  
These results point to the following policy implications: 
•  Realism is needed in assessing the pro-poor benefits of support to 
collective action. Because wealthier and better-educated households tend 
to participate more in groups and to have larger networks, development 
practitioners need to pay more attention to identifying those barriers that 
prevent the poor—or other segments of the population—from participating 
in collective action. Not only because they have lower levels of wealth, but 
also because they participate less in risk-smoothing networks, the poor 
are more likely to be vulnerable to both covariate and idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
•  Realism is also needed in terms of the role of collective action in 
responding to shocks. Specifically, where households have limited ability 
to develop spatial networks, collective action has limited ability to respond 
to covariate (common) shocks. Direct public action is more appropriate in 
this area.  
•  Collective action may be more suitable for providing an insurance function 
in response to idiosyncratic (individual) shocks. Public action and policy 
that supports forms of collective action in this area must recognize, as 
exemplified by the iddir study here, that successful collective action:  
o  is based on norms of trust and reciprocity. As trust is easier to 
destroy than create, the principal of “do no harm” is important 
here, particularly when government actions are aimed toward 
existing collective action institutions; 
o  has mechanisms for overcoming information problems; and 
o  has mechanisms for sanctioning individuals who break the rules. 
•  Iddir providing health insurance exist in only some of the villages where 
illness shocks are prevalent and costly. Supporting the dissemination of 
examples of good practice across space—helping create associations of 
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